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Despite the ongoing interest in the concept of tacit knowledge and the continual conceptual 
development of the idea, little attention has been paid to whether this ongoing novelty has 
done much to advance the concept. This development paper seeks to examine the value of 
developing new conceptual ideas in advancing the concept of tacit knowledge within 
knowledge management discourse. It does so by looking at the development of the tacit 
knowledge idea within knowledge management through the lens of social science and 
management literature on business concepts. The paper argues that whilst conceptual novelty 
has done much to draw attention to hitherto ignored aspects of tacit knowledge without 
simply repackaging old ideas, it has done so at the expense of giving tacit knowledge a 
faddish quality at the expense of a firm grounding in its philosophical roots. 
Introduction 
Ever since the early 1990s, the management of tacit knowledge has been treated as a holy 
grail of knowledge management. The impact of tacit knowledge upon a range of management 
activities including innovation, information systems development, and strategic decision 
making has been well documented. Also well documented has been the challenges associated 
with managing tacit knowledge such as the inability for it to be shared and the difficulties in 
evaluating tacit knowledge sharing initiatives. 
 
One way scholars have tried to address this problem has been through attempts to clarify the 
concept of tacit knowledge. This has led to an accumulation of new ideas about the concept 
ranging from tacit knowledge as a type of knowledge, as a process of knowing, as an 
individual phenomenon, as a social property, as ineffable, and as being capable of elicitation. 
However, no one to date has examined whether this increased novelty has truly advanced the 
discourse on tacit knowledge. 
 
This developmental paper seeks to evaluate the value of novelty in advancing discourse 
surrounding tacit knowledge. It does so by examining tacit knowledge discourse through the 
lens of social science and management literature on concepts. In so doing, this paper will 
show, on the one hand, that such novelty has advanced the discourse on tacit knowledge by 
drawing attention to new aspects while avoiding merely repackaging old ideas. It will also, on 
the other hand, question the value of conceptual novelty in advancing tacit knowledge 
discourse by giving tacit knowledge a faddish quality at the expense of a stronger rooting in 
older ideas. 
 
The Value of Conceptual Novelty in Advancing Tacit Knowledge Discourse 
 
In considering the value of novelty in advancing tacit knowledge discourse, this paper turns 
initially to the work of Blumer (1931). In looking at the usefulness of concepts more 
generally, he noted that novelty can be useful in that it provides a new point of view 
regarding an existing phenomenon. It does so by, firstly, firstly redirecting attention and then 
reorganizing phenomena, both of which enable the solution of existing problems. Redirecting 
attention, or, as Blumer (1931) called it, ‘sensitizing’ perception, occurs when the use of a 
concept enables the user to select and focus upon certain areas of relevance (Blumer, 1954). 
The importance of the shifting of attention afforded by concepts can be found in the fact that 
it precipitates the next stage of providing a new point of view – reorganising phenomena. 
 
This is because the redirection of attention enables one to, firstly, make distinctions 
(Maturana & Varela, 1987) then perceive new relations (Blumer, 1931) between objects 
present in a given phenomenon. The ability to make distinctions entails being able to “split 
the world into ‘this’ and ‘that’” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2005, p.121) by isolating the 
concept from background elements and distinguishes it from its opposite or opposites. From 
there, new relations can be perceived between ‘this’ and ‘that’ and, by so doing, enable the 
reorganization of the phenomenon in question (Blumer, 1931). Reorganizing phenomena in 
this way is important because it improves the capacity for problem solving (Blumer, 1931; 
Astley & Zammuto, 1992). 
 
This is because the new orientation brought on by the use of concepts enables the 
circumvention of problems tormenting old orientations (Blumer, 1931) by facilitating, in a 
manner akin to what Astley & Zammuto (1992) highlighted as ‘complicated understanding’ 
or ‘serial reframing’, the conceptualisation of problems in new ways based upon new, 
hitherto unconsidered, perspectives. This is particularly appropriate when the actor is faced 
with wicked problems – problems with multiple goals, definitions, means of resolution, and 
answers (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Reiter-Palmon & Illies, 2004). Consequently, this new 
orientation, “liberates frustrated activity and enables new action.” (Blumer, 1931, p.519) by 
arresting automatic problem definition and solution – where problems are defined, “in ways 
that fit with the problem solver’s past experience” (Reiter-Palmon & Illies, 2004, p.58) and 
solutions, “closely resemble solutions to similar past problems” (p.60) – and instead defining 
and solving problems in more original and creative (Reiter-Palmon and Illies, 2004) ways 
that challenge, “taken-for-granted assumptions, thereby opening up new potential courses of 
action.” (Astley & Zammuto, 1992, p.456). This is particularly so if the new orientations 
afforded by the use of the concept is are ‘liberating alternatives’ (Argyris, 2003) that 
concerns, “changing the status quo” (p.424) or, “questions the status quo and to create rare 
emancipatory events.” (p.446). 
 
It can be seen that the concept of tacit knowledge has continually provided a new point of 
view of the phenomenon of managing knowledge. For instance, when Nonaka (1991; 1994) 
introduced the concept, he redirected attention to the management of tacit knowledge that 
was very difficult to express and was distinct from explicit knowledge which was easy to 
express and share. He then reorganised the phenomenon of managing knowledge by 
suggesting that while both types were mutually exclusive they interacted with each other in a 
knowledge creating cycle comprising the stages of socialisation (where tacit knowledge is 
shared through direct shared experience), externalisation (where tacit knowledge is converted 
to explicit knowledge through the use of dialogue and figurative language), combination 
(where explicit knowledge is shared through documents and databases), and internalisation 
(where explicit knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge through learning-by-doing). 
This reorganization led to a new solution to the problem of managing knowledge from using 
systems to capture and share existing knowledge to creating a set of conditions – through 
such things as providing a knowledge vision, providing physical, social, emotional, and 
mental spaces for interaction, and promoting the different stages of socialisation, 
externalisation, combination, and internalisation – that enable the creation of new knowledge. 
 
Further research into tacit knowledge has redirected subsequent attention to the various 
dimensions of tacit knowledge. This has led to a finer grained set of distinctions including: 
the distinction between personal tacit knowledge possessed by individuals (Linde, 2001) and 
social tacit knowledge possessed by groups (Spender, 1996; Cook & Brown, 1999; Linde, 
2001); the distinction between tacit knowledge that is truly inexpressible with that capable of 
expression through an exploration of meaning (Castillo, 2002); and that between cognitive 
tacit knowledge in the form of hunches and intuitions (Nonaka, 1994;), affective tacit 
knowledge in the form of feelings prior to being expressed as emotions (Bennet and Bennet, 
2008), and spiritual tacit knowledge (Bennet and Bennet, 2008). This has reorganised the 
management of tacit knowledge from a mere conversion process towards the development of 
tacit knowledge through processes of mimicry (Bennet and Bennet, 2008) or by a process of 
substitution where some of the tacit knowledge drawn upon by one individual when 
conducting a task – like bread making – is substituted by the tacit knowledge of others when 
they conduct a similar task (Ribeiro & Collins, 2007). This has led to further solutions of 
providing opportunities for mimicry and for allowing for the inevitability that some of the 
original tacit knowledge will be lost in subsequent actions. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that on one level, the continual novelty in tacit knowledge 
discourse has led to attention being redirected, firstly, to tacit knowledge itself and then to the 
dimensions of tacit knowledge. This has led the phenomena of managing knowledge to be 
reorganised into a greater level of detail based on an increasingly finer set of distinctions. 
This, in turn, has led to a series of new solutions from knowledge conversion to tacit 
knowledge substation. However, there is also an argument that the discourse regarding tacit 
knowledge has added nothing new and this will be covered in the next section. 
 
Nothing New With Tacit Knowledge: Tacit Knowledge as a Label 
 
This argument relates to the wider of of concepts being being used as labels for a particular 
object and does not add anything new about that object (Blumer, 1931). In other words, 
concepts used as labels gives rise to the phenomenon of ‘old wine in new wine bottles’ 
(Miller et al, 2004). Here, concepts offering a supposedly new orientation that is contrasted 
with archaic old concepts amount to nothing more than, “a rediscovery and repackaging of 
ideas, values, and approaches” (Miller et al, 2004, p.14) that had been hitherto forgotten 
(Abrahamson, 1996). In other words, they amount to no more than as new label for old ideas. 
As a result, the problems existing with the old conceptualization may not only not be 
circumvented but in fact perpetuated by the use of such concepts. 
 
The concept of tacit knowledge can be seen as one such label. Despite being presented as a 
new area for the attention of knowledge management researchers, tacit knowledge has 
included a range of old ideas. For instance, Takeuchi and Nonaka (2004) see tacit knowledge 
as encompassing, “…personal insights, intuitions, hunches, and inspirations” as well as 
“…beliefs, perceptions, ideals, values, emotions, and mental models” (p.4). To that list has 
been added ‘rules-of-thumb’, ‘procedures’, ‘routines’, ‘commitment’ (Nonaka and von 
Krogh, 2009), ‘gut feelings’, ‘meaning’ (Castillo, 2002), ‘guiding purpose’ (Bennet and 
Bennet, 2008), ‘identity’ and ‘practice’ (Linde, 2001). Consequently, it can be argued that the 
problem of managing knowledge that is very difficult to express has not been circumvented 
by the introduction and development of the tacit knowledge concept but perpetuated by it. 
Indeed, it appers that the field is no further along than when Nonaka first introduced the 
concept. However, ther is one further argument relating to the role of conceptual novelty in 
tacit knowledge discourse: that the increasing proliferation of new ideas has been detrimental 
to the field of KM. 
 
Novelty as Detrimental: the Faddish Nature of the ‘False Distinction’ 
 
This continual proliferation of new ideas relates to the phenomenon of conceptual innovation 
(Rescher, 1996) where knowledge producers continually produce new ideas, tools, and 
concepts in order to remain relevant to those demanding such knowledge (Huczynski, 1993). 
This, in turn, imputes a faddish quality upon a given field of inquiry whereby, in order to 
meet the insatiable demand for new ideas from managers (Huczynski, 1993), knowledge 
producers produce ideas in the form of killer apps that promise too much, deliver little, and 
consequently, have a short life cycle by being in vogue for a brief period before being 
displaced by others (Miller et al, 2004). In so doing, they undermine the ‘intellectual 
foundation’ (Donaldson and Hilmer, 1998) of these killer apps by not seeking to ascertain 
their robustness (Huczynski, 1993) but instead engaging in opportunism geared to enhancing 
their reputation. Therefore, conceptual innovation has the impact of continually producing 
new concepts at the expense of ascertaining the robustness of existing ones. 
 
Over recent years, such a claim has been levelled at the discourse surrounding tacit 
knowledge. A number of authors have stated that the continual proliferation of ideas about 
tacit knowledge has led to it being seen as a ‘cliché’ (Despres & Chauvel, 2002) and a 
‘buzzword’ (Oguz & Segun, 2011; Chase & Bontis, 2014). In so doing, it has undermined the 
intellectual foundation of the tacit knowledge concept. In particular, the aforementioned work 
of Nonaka and others introduced and perpetuated a false distinction tacit and explicit 
knowledge which was not present in the work of the philosopher from which the idea of tacit 
knowledge was drawn – Michel Polanyi. As such, this distinction glosses over Polanyi’s 
view of tacit knowing as a process upon which all knowledge is based (Mooradian, 2005; 
Tsoukas, 2005; Gourlay, 2006) and as a process that is irreducibly personal (Johnson, 2007). 
 
Further Development of the Paper 
 
The paper will be developed further for the conference in a number of ways: 
(1) More substantial conceptual work on each of the individual sections 
(2) An examination of the extent to which these ideas around conceptual novelty can be 
synthesised into an overall sensemaking framework 
(3) Highlighting the implications for both the producers of tacit knowledge discourse and 
the practitioners who draw on these ideas when managing knowledge. 
(4) An examination into the extent to which this work relates with work on practical 
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